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ABSTRACT: Changes in political structure, coalitions, and ideology
provide the context in which specific policies and programs are adopted
and, once adopted, expanded or trimmed. This article assays a portrait of
American politics in the early 1980s and the major trends relevant to
welfare choice. It is shown that voters have loosened their ties to parties
even while the parties have strengthened their organizational capacities.
Although there is little evidence that American voters wish to dismantle the
welfare state, the growing strength of the Republican party as a campaign
vehicle and the greater party competition among parties in all regions
suggest that Republican congressional and senatorial strength will be
stronger than in the fifties and sixties. Moreover, trends to expand citizen
rights that bear on welfare issues may have been arrested. Issue hetero-
geneity, the dissolution of older political coalitions, and economic trends
suggest that broad welfare state issues will be on the back burner, though
there is no evidence that broad-based programs face significant cutbacks.
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THE United States has been a welfarestate laggard. Definitions of the
welfare state include retirement pen-
sions, unemployment subsidies, univer-
sal medical care services or payments,
minimum incomes for families, and ser-
vices for children and mothers as core
components of the welfare state. Com-
pared to many economically developed
countries, the United States was slow to
universalize its pension system and to
provide widespread access to medical
care. To this day it does not have a
minimum income program for families.
The United States has been a leader in
the provision of mass public educational
opportunities; however, experts on the
welfare state often do not consider ed-
ucational provisions a core program of
the welfare state. Those provisions can
be supported by states with little commit-
ment to the provision of minimum wel-
fare needs for dependent populations. 1
Although the Unit.ed States has been
a welfare state laggard, by the end of the
1960s the political process resulted in
the adoption of a number of programs
that substantially closed the gap be-
tween it and other advanced industrial
nations.’ The adoption of the Supple-
mental Security Income (SSI) program,
which universalized the retirement sys-
tem, and the adoption of Medicare and
Medicaid, providing medical insurance
and service to the elderly and the poor,
were major additions that brought us
closer to our European peers. Sundquist
shows how the welfare state legislative
agenda of the 1960s was a continuation
of the New Deal prepared by liberal
policy experts, inside and outside of
Congress. It came to fruition in the
context of the civil rights movement and
liberal Democratic presidencies.
Yet, by the late 1970s and 1980s the
political trends had changed. Faced with
high rates of inflation, recession, budget
deficits, a rapid growth in social expen-
ditures, and perceived military weak-
nesses, the Carter administration be-
gan-and the Reagan administration
has continued-to attempt to rein in the
welfare state.
Is this direction inevitable? What are
the prospects for rekindling the welfare
state? Are there underlying trends in
political ideology, in socioeconomic
political coalitions, in political struc-
tures, that imply one direction or an-
other for the future of the welfare state?
Has the New Deal coalition broken up?
Is the party system breaking up? If so,
what are the implications for welfare
programs?
Here I ruminate on the changing tides
and structures of politics in the United
States. Commentators on the American
political scene have identified a number
of trends in American politics that, if
confirmed, might have strong implica-
tions for welfare policies and choices: a
weakening of party structure, the grow-
th of media politics, changing ideology,
and strong federal court supports for
transforming privileges into program
entitlements. Each of these, if true, has
implications for program choice and the
overall directions of the welfare state.
My review leads me to the conclusion
that some presumed trends are shakier
than might be expected. Moreover, the
political trends and changes that are
1. Harold L. Wilensky, The Welfare State
and Equality: Structural and Ideological Roots of
Public Expenditures (Berkeley: University of Cal-
ifornia Press, 1975), pp. 3-7.
2. The political-legislative history of the
adoption of welfare state policies in the 1960s is
told in James L. Sundquist, Politics and Policy:
The Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson Years
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1968).
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operative have mixed implications for
the welfare state.
I examine the implications of polit-
ical change for welfare policy under a set
of underlying assumptions about the
socioeconomic constraints facing the
United States. Those constraints are
treated in greater detail elsewhere in this
issue of The Annals,3 but let us make
them explicit here. First, there is little
doubt that the aging of the population
will create pressures for increases in the
funding base of public retirement pro-
grams-social security, SSI-and health
programs for the elderly. Moreover,
since social security and other programs
were never based upon pure annuity-
insurance principles that tied returns to
a cohort solely to the moneys received
from, and invested for, the cohort, the
tax base through which the programs
are funded is heavily dependent upon
the state of the economy and the will-
ingness of Congress and the younger
generations to fund the increasing costs
of those programs.
Second, without substantial econom-
ic growth to fuel expanded tax revenues,
or without major declines in expendi-
tures in other sectors, there will be
continuing pressures to constrain the
expansion of health and welfare expen-
ditures and to restructure programs
whose costs are increasing rapidly. By
1984 serious attempts had been made to
restructure the funding of social security
and to at least trim its benefits, and
hospital reimbursement formulas had
been changed in order to cut into the
galloping expansion of health care costs.
Third, pressures to rein in the welfare
state could be resisted and the welfare
state expanded if the American people
were willing to expand the tax base and
raise tax levels. By comparative stan-
dards, Americans are not overtaxed.
Compared to most Western European
countries the proportion of national
income that is channeled to the govern-
ment is relatively reasonable.4 
4
However, the issue is not how Ameri-
can tax rates compare to Sweden or to
Germany but what the population is
willing to bear in the way of taxes-how
much the citizenry and politicians be-
lieve they should be taxed. And there is
little likelihood of anything besides
marginal increases in rates of American
taxation over the next decade or so. The
mid-1970s were characterized by tax
revolts in California that substantially
lowered taxes on real estate. While some
states, such as Ohio and Michigan,
raised taxes to cope with budget deficits
in the recession years of the early 1980s,
there is no evidence that Americans are
prepared to entertain large increments
in their tax expenditures in order to
fund expanded welfare social programs.
Now, holding these assumptions in
the background, what are some of the
major trends in American political life
that bear on policy preferences? Politi-
cians must be elected, thus voter prefer-
ences and party leanings are of import.
Is there a trend toward conservatism
and do the parties differ in their con-
servative/ liberal identifications? Parties
aggregate preferences, thus party organ-
ization bears on how preferences are
shaped by party structures. Can the
Democrats outmobilize the Republi-3. See W. Allen Spivey, "Problems and Par-
adoxes in Economic and Social Policies of Mod-
ern Welfare States,"this issue of The Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Sci-
ence ; William C. Birdsall and John L. Hankins,
"The Future of Social Security," ibid.
4. Public Expenditure Trends, OECD Stud-
ies in Resource Allocation, no. 5 (Paris: Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment, 1978).
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cans ? Presidential politics and how pres-
idents relate to Congress is of impor-
tance, thus changes in the presidency
and in its interaction with Congress
must be examined. Courts in interaction
with bureaucracies and legislatures de-
fine the living constitution; they define
rights and benefits and their distribution
to the population, thus I must examine
the trends in citizenship rights as chan-
neled by the courts. Finally, overall
trends in political integration, social
movements, and issue generation in the
larger society must be examined; for it is
in these areas of political organization
that some of the larger differences be-
tween the United States and Europe are
found.
We will see that there are in fact
conflicting trends within the United
States. There is broad support for the
continuing of basic social welfare pro-
grams, even though the growing strength
of the Republican party, the decline in
labor union support, and the fragmenta-
tion of the issue agenda dissolve support
for major new initiatives.
PARTY STRENGTHS
AND ATTACHMENTS
Trends in voter attachments to par-
ties and the correlates of those attach-
ments tell us much about the possibil-
ities of policy choice in a democracy. If
voters are increasingly attached to par-
ties, and the social bases of parties differ
significantly, then we are at least partly
on the way to predicting the direction of
policy choice in America. Parties in
office will attempt to represent the in-
terests of the underlying class or group
preferences of their supporters. On the
other hand, if voters are weakly tied to
parties, and if groups are not clearly
identified with parties or do not see a
link between their policy preferences
and party stands, there may be increas-
ing indeterminacy in the linkage be-
tween parties and voters.5
What do we know about trends in
partisan attachment over the last several
decades? First, it is widely recognized
that the proportion of the population
indentifying themselves as independents
or weak partisans increased rapidly in
the 1960s and 1970s. Once a minority,
independents now outnumber Repub-
licans substantially-five to three-and
almost equal the number who claim to
be Democrats. Moreover, independents
vote less, are less aware of the position
of candidates, and have less interest in
politics.
It turns out, however, that there are
subtle distinctions to be made in the
meaning of the growth of independents.
Surveys have asked not only whether
respondents are Democrats, Republi-
cans, or independents, but have also
probed their leanings as independents or
as party identifiers. Partisans or leaning
independents-those who claim to be
independents but also claim to have a
preference-have greater knowledge of
politics than plain independents. In-
deed, leaning independents have greater
knowledge of politics and vote more
consistently than people who claim to be
weakly identified with particular par-
ties-the contrast here is between a
weak partisan and a partisan indepen-
dent. It would appear that although
party attachment has declined, knowl-
edgeability and interest have not de-
5. A comprehensive review of many of the
issues raised in this section is found in Donald R.
Kinder and David O. Sears, "Public Opinion and
Political Action," in The Handbook of Social
Psychology, 3rd ed., ed. Gardner Lindzey and
Eliot Aronson (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wes-
ley, forthcoming).
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clined as much. It is the case that strong
partisanship has declined by about a
third since 1952. The rise of independent
voting shows itself in one other indica-
tor, the increase in split-ticket voting.
Split-ticket voting between members of
Congress and the president has in-
creased substantially, from 15 percent in
the 1950s to over 25 percent in the 1970s.
Table I presents basic data about party
attachment.
Although Democrats of all kinds
continue to outnumber Republicans by
a substantial margin, many more mem-
bers of both parties are weakly attached.
They do not have strong identifications,
they split votes, and even if they do have
strong identifications they are more like-
ly to defect than they were in the 1950s.
Not only have attachments to parties
become more volatile, but participation
in elections has declined. For instance,
the percentage of eligible voters voting
declined from 63 percent in 1960 to 53
percent in 1980; off-year congressional
election voting declined from 45 percent
in 1962 to 35 percent in 1978.6 Abram-
son and Aldridge attribute the decline to
a lessening of party loyalty, which leads
to less concern about electoral outcomes
and to a perception that government is
less able to respond effectively. It is clear
that the decline in turnout and in par-
tisanship is especially prominent among
TAB LE 1
PARTY IDENTIFICATION IN SELECTED OFF-YEAR ELECTIONS
1954-82 (Percentage)
SOURCE: &dquo;Party Identification in the United States, American National Election Studies Data,
1952-82,&dquo; Table of the American National Election Studies, Center for Political Studies, University
of Michigan.
6. Paul R. Abramson and John H. Aldrich,
"The Decline of Electoral Participation in Amer-
ica," American Political Science Review, 76: 502-
52 (Sept. 1982).
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younger cohorts, although the older
groups have also decreased their par-
ticipation.
So far, I have discussed attachment
to party without discussing the social
bases of attachment and shifts in the
social base. Have Catholics become less
likely to vote Democratic? What about
Jews? Has the attachment of issues to
parties changed? Answers to these kinds
of questions suggest some realignment
in the social bases and ideological pre-
ferences of the population. In most
economically developed countries there
has been a correlation between class and
leftist voting, the working classes voting
for leftist parties. This relationship has
been weakest in the United States,’ but
other social markers, such as religion
and region, have had strong correla-
tions. In the past two decades, class as a
predictor of voting in the United States,
always weak, has declined even further,
and so has religion. On the other hand,
there has been some substantial group
realignment.
The most penetrating analysis of
group realignment is found in John
Petrocik’s recent study of party coali-
tions and issue realignment He finds
that there has not been a shift of any
sizable proportion in the extent to which
the voting population has become more
conservative. Petrocik finds that of the
changes accounting for Republican
presidential victories in the 1970s, less
than one-third can be accounted for by
the electorate becoming more conserva-
tive. What Petrocik does find is a rolling
realignment of groups in the extent to
which they identify one party or another
as conservative or liberal on domestic
issues. The two issues that show cleanest
realignment are, on the one hand, the
identification of the Democratic party
as clearly the one that supports policies
more favorable to blacks, and on the
other hand, southern conservative
whites’ belief that the Republican party
supports more conservative policies on
welfare-related issues. More than ever,
the Republican party captures the con-
servative vote.
It is easy to forget that as late as 1932
most blacks saw the Republican party as
their party, and that as late as the
beginning of the 1960s conservative
southern whites still were in the Demo-
cratic party. By the late 1970s blacks had
moved almost completely into the
Democratic column. At the same time
upper- and middle-status southerners
had become almost evenly split between
Republican and Democratic attach-
ments, and white working-class mem-
bers had substantially lowered their at-
tachment to the Democratic party.9
Thus on race and welfare issues the
party linkage has become much more
clearly focused.
Of course, these are not the only
changes in party alignments that have
occurred. For instance, upper-status
northeastern whites are more likely to
vote Democratic in 1980 than they were
in the 1960s, while Jews, a small voting
group, are slightly more likely to vote
Republican in the 1980s than they were
in the 1960s. But the most fundamental
shift has been the growth of a two-party
South, with the Republican party being
7. Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The
Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand
McNally, 1963).
8. John R. Petrocik, Party Coalitions: Re-
alignments and the Decline of the New Deal Party
System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1981).
9. Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John
R. Petrocik, The Changing American Voter
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1979), pp. 221-23.
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the repository of more conservative pol-
icy preferences.
It is worth noting that a key media
issue of the 1980s, the relation of wom-
en’s vote to parties, did not surface as a
voting predictor throughout the 1960s
and 1970s. Indeed, women and men
voted so much alike in these decades
that gender was not a predictor of party
identification or of voting. Gender made
so little difference in elections until 1984
that political scientists dropped it from
statistical analysis.
The fact that the Republican party is
more clearly identified today with con-
servative positions-especially those re-
lated to welfare-type issues-than it was
in the 1960s, does not mean, however,
that the Republican party will be op-
posed to all issues related to the welfare
state. Some issues, such as changes in
social security laws, cut too wide a swath
across the electorate for the party to
ignore constituent demands. It is likely
that on broad-based, middle-class social
welfare or welfare state issues, the posi-
tions of Democrats and Republicans
will be much closer than they are on
welfare state issues that relate to the very
poor. Indeed, Lawrence Bobo has doc-
umented a backlash on civil rights mil-
itancy that can easily contribute to nega-
tive attitudes toward poor blacks and
related welfare policies.&dquo;’ Republicans
and Democrats will be close together on
social security and mortgage subsidies.
They are more likely to split on Aid to
Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and infant nutrition programs.
Although there has been a growth in
independent voting, and some party
realignment related to race and welfare,
my discussion ignores another impor-
tant dimension of party politics-the
extent to which domestic party politics
keys on one or two issues, as contrasted
with confronting a multitude of issues.
It is too easy to forget that the Roosevelt
era and the strong polarization of pol-
itics along class- and welfare-related
issues was a new phenomenon in Amer-
ican politics, at least to the extent that a
pure class issue dominated the party
images and polarization.
Everett Ladd and Charles Hadley
argue that in fact the breakup of the
New Deal coalition is a return to a more
normal style of American party constel-
lation.&dquo; The New Deal coalition has
changed, not only because of the shift of
status groups-ironically enough, the
dropping of the southern part of the
New Deal coalition lowers Democratic
dominance in the political process at the
same time that it increases the clarity of
party positions-but also as result of a
more complicated issue-ideological
agenda. Acid rain, environment, gay
rights, the new cultural agenda, family
issues, women’s rights, pro-choice/ pro-
life are issues unheard of in the 1950s.
The new political agenda on domestic
issues is not as easily seen as a left/ right,
socialist/ capitalist, or social democrat/
capitalist split. The complexity of that
new agenda makes it much more dif-
ficult to see a singular pattern of pro-
grammatic support for welfare state
expansion, as could be seen in the 1950s
or early 1960s. It is quite possible for
capital and labor to align on one side on
some environmental issues, and Repub-
10. Lawrence Bobo, "Racial Hegemony:
Group Conflict, Prejudice, Ambivalence and the
Paradox of American Racial Attitudes" (Ph.D.
diss., University of Michigan, forthcoming), chap.
3.
11. Everett Carll Ladd, Jr., and Charles D.
Hadley, Transformation of the American Party
System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to
the 1970s (New York: W. W. Norton, 1975), pp.
332-35.
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lican and New Left environmentalists to
be on the other side. Different issues,
such as those related to family policy,
women’s rights, and abortions, split
traditional alliances-or unite tradition-
al adversaries-once again. Catholic
supporters of Democratic party policies
may align with Protestant fundamental-
ist Republicans on abortion policies.
Finally, some issues, such as the rapid
increase in medical costs and a percep-
tion that welfare-related spending is
increasing, lead to a search for solutions
and the growth of a neoconservative
ideology almost regardless of party.
Having said this, it should be noted
that there is very little evidence of a shift
in mass support for welfare state pro-
grams. In 1982, well after the welfare
state was supposed to be in trouble and
well after the growth of the New Right,
mass public opinion still supported core
welfare state programs.
Philip Arthur AuClaire summarized
data from representative national sam-
ples interviewed by the National Opin-
ion Research Center between 1976 and
1982.’2 Respondents were asked to indi-
cate where government was spending
too much. In 1982, well after the welfare
state was supposed to be in trouble,
there was actually a decrease in the
proportion of respondents who thought
we were spending too much on social
welfare. (See Table 2.) There was a
significant increase in the proportion
who thought we were spending too
much on military and defense.
The term &dquo;social welfare&dquo; is a global
one and may carry negative images.
Even though the trend indicated in
Table 2 shows a decline, the absolute
percentage calling for a cut is quite
large. What happens if citizens are asked
about their support of specific social
welfare programs such as social secur-
ity, Food Stamps, AFDC?
In the spring of 1983 the Detroit Area
Study asked a sample of adults drawn
from the Detroit metropolitan area-
not just the inner city-their spending
preferences for a number of specific
programs. The preferences of this sam-
ple are very clear. They call for the
expansion of expenditures on social
security and the environment-less than
10 percent favor cuts in social security
programs. Even programs such as
AFDC and unemployment benefits fare
better than national defense. In this
respect, the American population’s sup-
port of welfare state programs mirrors
that found in Western European coun-
tries. &dquo; 3
Although support for core programs
remains firm, other aspects of federal
growth have become suspect. There has
been a growing disenchantment with the
power and intrusiveness of the federal
government. Such concerns may block
support for the development of new
programs.’4
How can we sum up these trends in
party attachments and issue alignments?
There remains strong support for core
welfare state programs. However, I con-
clude that there has been a weakening
attachment to political parties and an
increase in the volatility of the elector-
ates. Voters split their choices more,
12. "Public Attitudes toward Social Welfare
Expenditures," Social Work, 29:139-45 (Mar.-
Apr. 1984).
13. Richard M. Coughlin, Ideology, Public
Opinion and Welfare Policy: Attitudes toward
Taxing and Spending in Industrialized Societies
(Berkeley, CA: Institute of International Spend-
ing, 1980).
14. Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and
Edward J. Schneider, American National Election
Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952-78 (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), p. 171.
56
there has been a decrease in continuity
from president to president-until Rea-
gan, it had been 20 years since a pres-
ident served two terms-and partisan
attachments have clearly declined. Issue
coherence has also declined. At the same
time, there has been some party re-
alignment, at least to the extent that
some groups previously attached to the
Democratic party are no longer so at-
tached, and other groups, previously
attached to the Republican party, have
changed, sometimes slightly, their at-
tachment. On domestic matters, at least,
the Democratic party would appear to
be more liberal than it was in the 1950s,
because the southern Democrats who
were conservative have now joined the
Republican party. Yet, as I argue later,
it may well be that even though the
Democrats enjoy an edge in the so-
called normal vote, the ability of the
Republican party to mobilize the vote




The strength of parties has two di-
mensions : (1) the attachment of voters
to parties; and (2) the internal organ-
ization and cohesion of parties so that
parties and their leaders can deliver the
vote-both on election day and, once
politicians are elected, in legislative and
executive action.
The decline of partisan attachment
need not signal weak parties. As organ-
izations, parties can be more or less
strong, even if voters are more volatile in
their voting behavior. Parties are organ-
izationally strong if they can systemat-
TAB LE 2
RESPONDENTS WHO THOUGHT TOO MUCH WAS SPENT NATIONALLY
IN SELECTED AREAS, 1976-82 (Percentage)
SOURCE: Philip Arthur AuClaire, &dquo;Public Attitudes toward Social Welfare Expenditures.&dquo;
Copyright 1984, National Association of Social Workers, Inc. Reprinted with permission, from
Social Work, Vol. 29, No. 2, March-April 1984, p. 140.
*’A minus sign indicates a decrease in antispending sentiment; a plus sign an increase in anti-
spending sentiment.
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ically mobilize resources to pursue the
vote. They are strong and effective if
they have the resources to pursue the
vote and are able to deliver it.
One facile and common claim about
American political parties is that their
internal strength has significantly de-
clined as their control of patronage
resources has declined. Before civil ser-
vice requirements became widely used in
the hiring and retention of city and state
employees, political parties were able to
use the spoils of office to attract fol-
lowers who also worked for the parties.
Patronage, of course, included not only
jobs, but city contracts and other bene-
fits. The growth of civil service systems,
competitive bidding requirements, and
universalistic federal welfare systems
has each disrupted a basis of party
machine strength. The party machine as
a source of welfare benefits has disap-
peared. Its ability to deliver a large
number of lower-level jobs has been
severely restricted, although a number
of judicial and executive appointments
are still politically made. Contracts are
increasingly scrutinized by the press and
are offered through competitive bid-
ding. 15
The last of the big city bosses who
could deliver a city, a state, and an
election was Mayor Daly of Chicago.
And the last presidential election that
was severely affected by a city machine
was the Kennedy election of 1960.
The decline of the city machines
might lead one to assume that party
organizations at the state and local
levels are weak. However, recent anal-
ysis suggests quite a different picture.
James L. Gibson and colleagues have
developed measures of party organiza-
tional strength at the state level. 16 The
measures included standard measures of
organization or bureaucratic strength:
number of organizational divisions,
budgets, full-time personnel, research
TABLE 3
PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD GOVERNMENT SPENDING
ON FEDERALLY FINANCED PROGRAMS (Percentage of Respondents)
SOURCE: Yeheskel Hasenfeld, &dquo;Public Attitudes toward the Welfare State&dquo; (Manuscript,
Detroit Area Study, School of Social Work, University of Michigan, Spring 1983).
NOTE: Based on 550 respondents, Spring 1983.
15. James Q. Wilson, "The Economy of Pat-
ronage," Journal of Political Economy 69:369-80
(Aug. 1961).
16. James L. Gibson et al., "Assessing Party
Organization Strength," American Journal of
Political Science, 27(2): 193-222 (May 1983).
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programs, fund-raising drives, newslet-
ter publications, and so on.
Three conclusions emerge. First, at
the state level, party organizations are
stronger in 1975-80 than 1960-64. Sec-
ond, both Democratic state units and
Republican units are stronger overall.
Third, however, there is marked region-
al variation, so that Democrats in the
Northeast and Midwest actually appear
to have weaker organizations as of 1980
than they had in the 1960 period, while
those in the South and Southwest re-
main strong in 1980. Republicans in all
regions appear to be stronger.
A series of in-depth reports by
Thomas Edsal suggests that currently
Republicans have an even larger ad-
vantage in their ability to raise money
and in their organizational develop-
ment. 17 Although voters may be more
volatile, and although Democrats still
outnumber Republicans, it appears trait
in the 1980s Republicans are in a better
position to use resources to mobilize the
vote.
However, the increasing ability of
state parties to staff organizations does
not mean that parties can deliver votes;
nor can mere Republican party strength
cover for weak candidates. As Ladd and
Hadley note, modern campaigns are
increasingly candidate-, issue-, and me-
dia-oriented.1s Incumbent candidates
win 87 percent of the elections they run
in. Name recognition gives incumbents
enormous leverage in congressional elec-
tions over challengers. And both Demo-
cratic and Republican incumbents are
able to finance reelection campaigns
through personal fund-raising organi-
zations.
State party organizations in the mod-
ern period have less to do with con-
trolling incumbents than they do with
financing campaigns in which challeng-
ers are promising and with encouraging
strong challengers to run. In the modern
era the state political machine is a
facilitator of campaigns, rather than a
controller of candidates. Jacobson and
Kernell argue that in the late 1970s and
in 1980 the Republicans were better at
funding challengers and at channeling
money to good challengers than were
the Democrats.’9 So, at least by the late
1970s and early 1980s, the organiza-
tional advantage for supporting candi-
dates belonged to the Republicans.
Whether that is a long-range trend or
not remains to be seen. The organ-
izational techniques developed in the
late 1970s can be copied by the Demo-
crats, though the Republicans may have
a long-term advantage in that their
constituencies have more discretionary
income.
The growth of strong party organ-
izations that help recruit candidates and
provide campaign management skills
has substantive implications for wel-
fare-related programs. Although incum-
bents tend to win, in the modern age
they are staying in office for shorter
periods of time: there is more turnover.
Since parties and party activists-on the
Left or the Right-are more ideological
than the voters, the growing role of
parties in recruiting and funding candi-
dates may lead to a more ideological and
coherent set of candidates. If the advan-
tage has swayed to Republican organ-
izations, party consensus may be stron-
ger against welfare-related legislation
17. Washington Post, 6 and 7 June 1984.
18. Ladd and Hadley, Transformation of the
American Party System.
19. Gary L. Jacobson and Samuel Kernell,
Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), p.
97.
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than public opinion. The Republican
agenda is more likely to emphasize




The changes in voter attachments
and party organization are important,
but there are other aspects of the ability
of regimes to develop coherent policy. It
could be argued that what is really
important is the ability of Congress to
concert on policy and the ability of the
president to cajole and lead. Have there
been changes in congressional organ-
ization and in presidential elections that
have implications for the coherence and
direction of welfare policy?
There certainly have been large
changes in the way in which Congress
conducts its business. For one, the 1960s
saw the breakup of the southern-con-
trolled seniority system in Congress.
During the same time that the Repub-
lican party broke the Democratic strong-
hold in the South, northern congres-
sional representatives acted to take pow-
er away from committee chairs and
make comittee chairs more responsive
to the membership. If the membership
concerts in a given direction, it is in a
position to have a larger impact today
than earlier.2°
Yet, other institutional processes may
make it difficult to create consensus.
The proliferation of staff and subcom-
mittees creates multiple agendas. Eulau
and McCluggage describe the prolifera-
tion of functions in Congress.21 The
various components of the welfare state
become parceled out over a larger num-
ber of subcommittees. Thus, in general,
the combination of weak party control
over incumbents, the rise of multiple
jurisdictions and proliferation of staff
functions, the decline of the seniority
system, and the weakening of leadership
control in Congress all contribute to
making Congress a more difficult place
to concert on policy initiatives. Only the
possibility of a new ideological consen-
sus among activists weighs in favor of
concerted policymaking.
At the same time, the rise of the
primary system deprives the state party
of much of a role in presidential candi-
date selection. Although presidential
candidates still must end up running on
one party ticket or the other, they are
relatively independent of party organ-
izations. Jimmy Carter was more ex-
treme in this than many presidential
candidates, but it is a general rule of
modern politics that winning presiden-
tial candidates-those who succeed in
early primaries-gain media access and
financial access relatively independently
of party. Presidential candidates may
work closely with state and national
party leadership, but as a matter of
choice more than of structured neces-
sity.
So, both Congress and presidents are
loosely linked to parties. Compared to
those in Europe, parties in the American
system have never been very well disci-
plined entities. Because of the separa-
tion of presidential and congressional
elections-because state party machines
are only loosely linked to national party
organizations-they have never been20. Sundquist, Politics and Policy, pp. 512-23.
21. Heinz Eulau and Vera McCluggage, "Pro-
liferation and the Institutional Structure of the
Congressional Committee System," in The Chal-
lenge of Social Control: Citizenship and Institu-
tion Building in Modern Society; Essays in Honor
of Morris Janowitz ed. Gerald Suttles and Mayer
N. Zald (Norwood, NJ: ABLEX, forthcoming).
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tightly disciplined in the model of par-
liamentary parties. Thus, strong con-
sensus and party discipline or party
cohesion is more likely only in times of
crisis, and indeed then such unity is
more likely when external crises emerge
than when divisive national issues are on
the agenda. Recent trends have exac-
erbated these tendencies toward frag-
mentation and proliferation.
A final item in this catalogue is the
growth of pressure groups and single-
issue politics. One characteristic of the
modern period has been the ability of
issue entrepreneurial groups to mobilize
resources-for example, money, lobby-
ing skills, and personnel-around very
specific issues. Resource-mobilization
theorists, such as McCarthy and Zald,
have discussed the growth of profes-
sional movements and movement or-
ganizers.22 Jack Walker has document-
ed the recent emergence of pressure
groups less related to occupations and
industries than early ones and funded by
a variety of foundations, patrons, and
sponsors. These new groups are inter-
ested in specific issues such as gun
control, abortion, environment, mari-
juana law repeal, and automobile safe-
ty.23 Naderism is a national tendency!
The growth of single-issue politics
increases the number of groups pressing
for specific policy changes. Moreover,
single-issue groups can have an impact
disproportionate to their membership
when they concentrate their resources
on specific issues. Troyer and Markle
have shown the powerful role of a
professional movement organization in
the battle against cigarette smoking. 14
Single-issue constituencies and groups
are not aligned with broad ideology or
policies. Gais, Peterson, and Walker
have described how the organization of
the White House has shifted to provid-
ing linkages directly between issue con-
stituencies and the executive branch.25
The consequence for politics is a great
array of political issues unlinked to
broader ideologies and visions of the
state. Single-issue politics contributes to
the diversity and lack of comprehen-
siveness of overall policy analysis.
The proliferation of subcommittees
and single-issue groups leads to a sec-
toralization of welfare-related issues.
Each area of welfare state policy has a
separate set of constituencies. There are
pressure groups, Congress members,
and institutions in and out of govern-
ment with interests in each subpolicy
arena-some such arenas are children,
child abuse, and child nutrition. When
combined with the trends in the election
of presidents and members of Congress,
one sees a continual seething competi-
tion for space on the legislative agenda.




The analysis so far has dealt with
trends in the formal structure of politics
and government. We have examined
trends in voting behavior, the legislative
22. John D. McCarthy and Mayer N. Zald,
The Trend of Social Movements in America:
Professionalization and Resource Mobilization
(Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press, 1973).
23. Jack L. Walker, "The Origins and Main-
tenance of Interest Groups in America," American
Political Science Review, 77: 390-406 (June 1983).
24. Ronald J. Troyer and Gerald E. Markle,
Cigarettes: The Battle over Smoking (New Bruns-
wick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1983).
25. Thomas L. Gais, Mark A. Peterson, and
Jack L. Walker, "Interest Groups, Iron Triangles,
and Representation Institutions in American Na-
tional Government," British Journal of Political
Science, 14: 180-82 (Jan. 1984).
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and executive processes, and the growth
of social movements and pressure
groups. There is another aspect of polit-
ical structure, at the same time more
global and less partaking of the formal
political apparatus, that deserves men-
tion-the extent to which the co-opta-
tion of major groups and interests into
the policy apparatus affects welfare
choices and trends.
In recent years political scientists
have examined the extent to which the
major social groups in a nation-reli-
gious groups, occupations and profes-
sions, labor and management, institu-
tions, and sectors such as education and
health care-are hierarchically integrat-
ed and centrally coordinated. Groups
and institutions are hierarchically inte-
grated to the extent that locally dis-
persed units are bound by regional and
national umbrella organizations .16 If,
for instance, a national council of labor
unions existed that on the one hand
spoke for labor and, on the other hand,
was accepted as an authoritative body
by union officials, we would speak of a
hierarchically integrated union struc-
ture. Or similarly, to the extent that we
had a national teachers union that spoke
for teachers in local areas, was respon-
sible to a central ministry of education,
and made demands on that central min-
istry, we would speak of a hierarchically
integrated educational system. The cen-
tral coordinating role depends upon the
extent to which other units in the nation
recognize the power and role of the
national representative organizations.
For instance, if unions were hierarch-
ically integrated and bargained on labor
policy in conjunction with peak em-
ployer groups and government officials,
labor-management relationships would
be described as corporatist.
At least theoretically, corporatism
can exist with or without competitive
elections and democratic politics. Italy,
in the time of Mussolini, is given as an
example of a corporatist polity without
democracy. On the other hand, Sweden
today is a corporatist, yet democratic,
state. Corporatism also can be said to
exist in one-party states, such as Mex-
ico, as long as major groups are repre-
sented and integrated in the decision
structure.
Most relevant here, where corpora-
tism includes strong labor unions and
strong social-democratic parties, the wel-
fare state becomes well entrenched even
in periods of retrenchments and reces-
sion. A relevant contrast is between
Japan and Sweden. Both are corpora-
tist, but Japan’s labor unions are dom-
inated and do not represent a significant
group in setting state policy. In a sense,
Japan can be considered a case of
incomplete corporatism; industry is
tightly integrated with government, but
labor representation is weak at the pol-
icymaking level.
Where does the United States fit in
such a picture of state policymaking? It
is clear that the United States is far from
a corporate state. First, labor and man-
agement are neither hierarchically or-
ganized nor coordinated. Although na-
tional groups, such as the American
Federation of Labor-Congress of In-
dustrial Organizations (AFL-CIO) and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce are
peak organizations, they do not include
all relevant industries and unions, nor
do they control their members. There is
some industrywide bargaining between
labor and management, but little peak
bargaining in which government poli-
26. Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard
Lehmbruch, Trends toward Corporatist Inter-
mediation, Contemporary Political Sociology,
vol. 1 (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979).
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cies are directly affected. Labor and
management in some industries will
concert to make representations to gov-
ernment officials; they will lobby for the
same thing-for instance, higher cus-
toms duties, or exclusion of foreign
automobiles or foreign steel-but they
do not work hand in hand on a regular
basis with government committees and
administrators. Moreover, at the level
above single industries there is little
coordination among industry groups
and little integration across groups,
whether they be labor and management,
education, health providers, or health
unions.
Second, because of the decentralized
structure of the political system, many
institutional sectors have a very weak
voice and do not operate much at the
national level. Teachers unions, for in-
stance, bargain on a one-on-one basis
either at the state level or, more usually,
at the school-board level. Hospital u-
nions bargain with individual hospitals
or occasionally with citywide bargain-
ing associations.
Third, the oscillation of parties and
the weak connection of labor to parties
mean that labor’s voice in the national
scene has always been weak compared
to the social-democratic leftist parties in
Europe. Although labor and labor u-
nions have historic ties to the Demo-
cratic party, they do not control party
policy. Moreover, many workers and
unions do not support the Democratic
ticket, and when a Democratic candi-
date wins a presidential election, labor
cannot count on strong access to the
White House.
Given the extent to which corpora-
tism is in fact very unlikely in the
American context, the important issue
becomes the extent to which the union
movement-which has always been a
major supporter of welfare state pol-
icies, though sometimes a supporter of
welfare policies more important for its
members than for the poor in general-
will become more powerful. But, of
course, it is clear that the union move-
ment is declining in power and, at least
over the last decade and a half, has had a
declining political role. Moreover, the
key growth areas in the United States-
service industries and high technology-
are the areas in which unions have
traditionally had the most difficulty
making inroads.
It would, of course, be a mistake to
assume that all unions are in a period of
retrenchment just because, for instance,
the automobile workers and steelwork-
ers are losing members. It would also be
a mistake to assume that specific unions
are not able to exercise real power and
clout in areas of direct concern to them
and their members. However, any pos-
sibility of strong unions to mount a
systematic drive for expansion of major
welfare state programs would seem to be
unlikely. The weakness of unions in the
most recent period is at least in part a
function of the ability of corporate
capitalism to move and invest in other
countries. The ability of management to
move capital internationally becomes
part of the process by which union
protection of jobs is broken down. Since
unions in America have little control
over capital flows, unions in this period
have to fight rearguard actions. One
direction possible for the welfare state in
the future does involve corporatist solu-
tions, for new blueprints calling for a
national industrial policy often require
the integration of labor, management,
and government. Nevertheless, current
trends in union strength and union
organization suggest greater, rather
than less, control of investment deci-
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sions by management. Unions have little




The growth of the welfare state oc-
curred not only through the develop-
ment of new programs for reaching out
to dependent populations, but also in
the establishment of the rights of cit-
izens to the program benefits. In nations
in which the welfare state has become
institutionalized these rights have been
tested in courts and treated as beyond
arbitrary bureaucratic intervention.
What has happened in the United States
in the area of citizenship rights? What
rules regulating government provision
of services have been developed both
through enacted law and through court
adjudication? Especially in the Ameri-
can case, with its strong separation of
powers and the strong role of the judi-
ciary, any account of the welfare state
must ask to what extent have goods,
services, and liberties become entitle-
ments-rights no longer dependent on
the arbitrary disposition of officials.2’
T. H. Marshall, a distinguished Brit-
ish sociologist, divided citizenship rights
into civil, political, and social. 2S Civil
rights included freedom of contract,
movement, and disposal of one’s labor.
Political rights included voting, office
holding, and political expression. Social
rights included access to economic
goods and services to maintain a tol-
erable level of living, health care, access
to education, and appropriate social
inclusion. Marshall was concerned with
citizenship rights beyond the political
and economic; social inclusion, the abil-
ity to participate in the community, was
also an emerging right. For Marshall,
civil rights came first, then political
rights, and finally social rights. Rights
may be constitutionally guaranteed or,
as in many European countries, they
may be strong legislative commitments
in which the unwritten constitution pro-
vides the guarantee.
What can be said about the extension
of rights in relation to the welfare state
in America? There would appear to be
four main trends. First, as the federal-
ization of programs occurred and as
federal courts adjudicated claims, citi-
zen access changed from discretionary
privileges granted by agencies to rights.
As developed through a long line of
cases, welfare benefits no longer were to
be treated as gifts or benefices; rather,
they were a new form of property. Once
the government sets up a park for public
access, or a welfare program, it no
longer can choose which citizens have
access to those programs unless the
criterion of choice has a direct relation-
ship to that program. For example,
people cannot be excluded from public
parks because of the way they dress; the
reason for excluding persons from
AFDC must deal with their family com-
position and income, not their race,
religion, or political views. In other
words, public programs, once enacted,
are available to all citizens for whom the
original legislation was intended, with-
out further discrimination or rights of
27. For a view from the Left of the process by
which privileges and gifts are transformed into
citizenship entitlements, see Rand E. Rosenblatt,
"Legal Entitlements and Welfare Benefits," in The
Politics of law: A Progressive Critique, ed. David
Kairys (New York: Pantheon, 1982), pp. 262-80.
For a conservative view of the process, see Jeremy
Rabkin, "The Judiciary in the Administrative
State," Public Interest, 71: 62-84 (Spring 1983).
28. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and
Social Development (Garden City, NY: Double-
day, Anchor Books, 1965), pp. 78-91.
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discretion on the part of officials. Uni-
versal entitlements occur in fully fed-
eralized programs. But even programs
such as Medicaid and AFDC, in which
some discretion in matching moneys or
in levels of benefits have been left to the
states, have had strong controls placed
upon the ability of the participating
states to exclude groups or individuals.
Second, civil rights have been ex-
tended to welfare state beneficiaries, or
dependents. The imprisoned or institu-
tionalized dependent population-men-
tal patients, prisoners-have rights of
expression, freedom of religion, some
freedom of communication, and access
to the courts, as do other citizens. It is no
longer the case that hospitalization or
imprisonment deprives citizens of many
of their civil rights, except freedom of
movement.
Third, the extension of entitlements
has been accompanied by the judicial-
ization of procedures. Now citizens have
a right to proper notice of administra-
tors’ decisions on allocation of benefits
to entitlement programs as well as a
right to appeal those decisions. This
means that the AFDC applicant has the
rights of notification and of appeal, as
does the social security applicant. The
right of appeal, of course, is a way of
limiting administrators’ discretion.
Finally, there has been a trend, pos-
sibly now arrested, in which the courts
mandate the level of welfare benefits.
The unfinished story of social rights in
the welfare state concerns the extent to
which the courts are willing to assert
what level of benefits the state must
provide if it is providing a public pro-
gram of some kind. One of the most
famous court decisions was that of
Wyatt v. Stickney. In that Alabama
case, Judge Johnson of the federal dis-
trict court ordered Alabama to raise
massively its level of provision of ser-
vices for people in state mental institu-
tions. The case of Wyatt v. Stickney
follows in a legal tradition in which the
courts have moved, on the one hand, to
limit involuntary incarceration to men-
tal hospitals in order to make it more
difficult for the state to put people in
institutions without their consent, and,
on the other, to establish standards for
what levels of care or treatment must be
provided, once incarceration has oc-
curred. The issue in these cases, espe-
cially when generalized to other areas,
involves the extent to which the state
must provide professionally responsible
levels of care, adequate levels of educa-
tion, adequate rehabilitation, profes-
sionally mandated levels of care to the
physically handicapped, and so on.
An activist/ expansionist view of the
matter is that judges are protectors of
individual rights, and, much as they do
in bankruptcy proceedings in which the
courts protect the claims of sharehold-
ers and others with property rights, they
should move to protect the substantive
rights of citizens. Rights become defined
in terms of an expanded view of citizen
entitlements. On the other hand, a re-
strictive view is that citizen entitlements
are, in the welfare arena at least, largely
legislative matters in which judges may
intrude only with great risk of upsetting
representative, majoritarian govern-
ment. By now it would appear that the
tendencies for court usurpation, or ex-
tension of power to the setting of benefit
levels, have been arrested. The Burger
Supreme Court has made few moves to
intrude on procedural rights, the civil
rights of inmates, or the universalistic
administration of programs.
On ideological grounds, one would
assume that a Supreme Court with an
increasingly conservative cast would be
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loath to expand substantive entitle-
ments. Yet court decisions and pro-
cesses are only loosely tied to immediate
political trends and prior ideological
expressions. In a situation in which
legislatures at the state and federal levels
often enact laws with broad social goals
but with ambiguous boundaries, it is
likely that the courts will continue to





There are several implications for
welfare policy and outcomes suggested
by this analysis. First, the fragmentation
of the system and the inability of con-
gressional leaders to control members
suggest that many major crises or prob-
lems of the welfare state will be difficult
to handle through normal political
channels. A good example is found in
the search for solutions to the short-
term social security crisis that led to the
1981 amendments to the Social Security
Act.’o The inability of Congress and the
president to concert finally led President
Reagan to establish a commission that
brought together significant parties out-
side of normal congressional processes.
Only through a process that brought in
all of the major lobbying groups and all
of the major figures in a kind of crisis
corporative solution was it possible to
enact amendments.
A second implication of our analysis
is that fragmented policymaking is like-
ly to be the rule. Comprehensive, or
even quasi-comprehensive, policy change
that is bargained out between major
groups and major policy changes that
are enacted through the involvement of
several different sectors are increasingly
difficult to achieve. On the other hand,
single-issue changes will occur. The 1984
changes in reimbursement formulas for
hospitals are an example. They signal
changes in the economics of health care.
And, as Garfinkel shows, small changes
in administrative procedures can have a
large impact on specific policies.&dquo;
Unfortunately, many of the groups
for whom welfare state policies have
deep implications are not themselves
able to mobilize forces for change. For
instance, teenage unemployment is now
near all-time highs. It is ironic that one
of the major groups trying to change
policies that affect teenage employment
are the fast-food chains and their lob-
byists. Here, where minimum-wage laws
impede the ability to get cheap inex-
pensive labor, we see a single-issue po-
litical strategy used that may have pos-
itive benefits for teenagers but that is the
political province of a different group
altogether.
But what of the implications of these
political trends for the larger issues of
welfare state politics? The larger issues
have to do with ( 1 ) the impact of welfare
policy on equality; and (2) the impact of
welfare state policy on universal access.
First, it is clear that the retrenchment
processes we have seen in the late 1970s
and 1980s have not led to the elimina-
tion of major welfare state programs. In
the areas of unemployment insurance,
social security, and health care, pro-
grams have been retained and even
expanded. For instance, the unemploy-
29. This argument follows that of Theodore J.
Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York: W. W.
Norton, 1969).
30. See Birdsall and Hankins, "Future of
Social Security."
31. See Irwin Garfinkel, "The Role of Child
Support Insurance in Antipoverty Policy," this
issue of The Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science.
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ment compensation system was changed
to expand the length of time people
could be eligible for unemployment in-
surance, as the percentage of the pop-
ulation that was unemployed increased.
But in other areas, such as medical care
financing and social security, an attempt
has been made to rein in the benefits of
the welfare state. It is difficult to say
whether these cuts have increased in-
equality because the cuts impact on such
a large part of the population. On the
other hand, programs such as Food
Stamps and AFDC, which are targeted
quite directly on the poor and especially
the younger poor, have been cut or the
rate of increase controlled, and in these
areas the trends in the welfare state
suggest that very dependent populations
with little political clout will become
even less equal in the future.
The other implication of this analysis
has to do with the universality of pro-
grams. The attempt to rein in the welfare
state and the attempt to become cost
efficient have led to a great focus upon
third-party payments, upon incentive
systems for people to take care of them-
selves by increasing private pension pro-
grams and the like. Corporations may
choose to provide child-care programs
as a fringe benefit to attract working
wives. That benefit becomes a business
expense and also decreases the profit
and corporate taxes paid by corpora-
tions. In general, over the next several
decades, we suspect that the political
trends, the slight conservative drift, and
the disillusionment with the welfare
state will all lead to solutions in which
services are less universally provided.
Core welfare state programs may be
protected, but marginal social services
and benefits are more likely to go to the
protected sectors and more middle-class
sectors than they are to be widely ex-
panded on a universal basis.
